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The rapid development of genetic research, determined, among others, by the requirements of The Human
Genome Project, and a gradual reorientation in the perception of the role of nature and culture in the process of
shaping complex networks of human relations by some political scientists, result in the increasing application of
genetic data and methods in research regarding political behaviours. One of the key philosophical objections
against the studies of the genetic foundations of political behaviours is that of excessive reductionism. This is
supposed to manifest itself in the inadequate selection of the level of analysis for the explained phenomenon, the
incompleteness of explanations and their low utility. My findings show that this objection is not sufficiently
supported by contemporary science. Both studies using classical behavioural genetic methodologies and studies
using DNA-based methods show that genes most likely play a role in political behaviours. Emphasising the sig-
nificance of genetic influences in the midst of multiple extra-genetic interactions generates highly idealised ex-
planations. Using the conceptual apparatus of the deformational concept of culture, I have demonstrated that the
omission of a number of important extra-genetic influences by researchers is a consequence of focusing on specific
causal patterns. This omission, however, does not entail negating the influence of non-genetic factors and,
importantly, it may not have to be permanent. Following this approach, if correct, the reductionism of research
into the genetic foundations of political behaviours is a standard cognitive procedure applied in science.1. Introduction
After decades of the total dominance of environmentalism, social
scientists now increasingly frequently recognise the relevancy of issues
concerning the role of genetic influences on the behaviour of individuals.
Psychologists, economists, sociologists, and political scientists use
various genetic methods to show the genetic foundations of the analysed
traits. Their research is very frequently met with far-reaching scepticism
resulting, as it seems, from the historical development of the respective
academic fields. This situation is particularly evident in political science,
where the belief that the behaviour of an individual is determined solely
by environmental factors still prevails. However, interdisciplinary fields
emphasising the relevance of biological factors are emerging and
growing outside the mainstream of political science research. One such
field is genopolitics. It was formed by introducing the data and methods
using in behavioural genetics into political science studies. Its goal is to
discover the genetic foundations of political behaviours.1 Genopoliticaln the broad sense; it refers to bo
that tries to explain complex ph
terature are: ‘unreflective’, ‘destru
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er Ltd. This is anopenaccess article ustudies can be roughly divided into two types: classical heritability
studies and molecular genetic studies. The first type enables estimating
the magnitude of the contribution of genetic and environmental factors
to the variance of the measured trait. The following research methods are
used in heritability studies: twin, adoption and family methods. The
second type also provides information on the heritability of the studied
trait and enables identifying gene variants or loci correlated with the
trait. The two main research methods used in the molecular approach
are: candidate gene association studies (CGAS) and genome-wide asso-
ciation studies (GWAS) (Hatemi et al., 2012; Ksiazkiewicz & Friesen,
2017).
One of the key philosophical objections against genopolitical studies
is that of excessive reductionism.2 This objection was, admittedly, the
subject of intense discussion some time ago (e.g. Charney, 2008; Charney
& English, 2012; Engelmann, 2010; Weiss, 2016); however, I think it
warrants a reconsideration, focusing on aspects that have not been noted
and/or exhaustively discussed. The excessive reductionism objectionth physical and mental components of activities affecting politics.
enomena with factors that can be considered as too simple in nature. Terms of
ctive’, ‘illicit’ and ‘greedy reductionism'.
nder theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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method in scientific research, in particular, lack of correct recognition of
its application's cognitive consequences. I will demonstrate that the
idealising assumptions adopted by the researchers of genopolitics are not
only justified, but even necessary to meet the adopted research objec-
tives, and that the reductionism of genetic studies, which is actually
implied by the idealisation method, is a standard procedure used in sci-
ence. The findings of this article, however, should not be equated with
the unconditional affirmation of genetic reductionism, nor are they in
any case the expression of a view that allows for the possibility of purely
genetic explanations of political behaviours. Research carried out on the
basis of various behavioural sciences clearly shows the importance of
environment and learning in the process of the formation and shaping of
behaviours in politics. In analysing the process leading from the formu-
lation of pre-theoretical objectives to the construction of genetic expla-
nations of political behaviours, I will use the conceptual apparatus of the
deformational concept of culture introduced by Nowak (1990, 2012).
Nowak treats idealisation as one of several deformational procedures
applied by humans. This approach contributes to a better understanding
of the essence and meaning of the cognitive method involving counter-
factual simplification of the studied phenomena.
I will start by discussing the basic methodological and epistemolog-
ical issues concerning the idealisation method. I will then focus on the
conceptual apparatus of the deformational concept of culture, juxta-
posing idealisation with the deformational procedures utilised in fields of
culture other than science. In the next section, I will briefly describe
examples of the studies regarding the genetic foundations of political
behaviours and the manner of linking political science with behavioural
genetics. I will further discuss the objection of excessive reductionism
made against the studies of the genetic foundations of political behav-
iours. This discussion will serve as a starting point for showing the role of
idealisation in research that reveals relationships between genes and
political behaviours, followed by a description of the reductionism of
genopolitical research. In the final section, I will summarise the pre-
sented reflections.
2. Idealisation
One of the most significant features of human cognition is its frag-
mentary nature. Due to our brains and minds' limited capabilities, we are
unable to register and internalise all aspects of the objects and phe-
nomena we experience. We take into account only those elements and
characteristics that we see as the most important in terms of current and
planned activities. This practice is present in all areas of human activity.
In science, it takes the form of a deformational procedure called
idealisation.
Idealisation is a subject of continuing interest for philosophers of
science. The procedure for creating idealised representations (models,
laws, theories etc.) of real objects can be found in: physics (Cartwright,
1983; Hartmann, 1998; Liu, 1998; McMullin, 1985), chemistry
(Fernandez-Gonzalez, 2013; Hendry, 1998; Seifert, 2020; Tobin, 2013),
geology (Shrader-Frechette, 1989), evolutionary biology (Godfrey--
Smith, 2009; Love, 2010; Sintonen & Kiikeri, 1994; Strevens, 2019),
ecology (Odenbaugh, 2005; Tuomivaara, 1994), economy (M€aki, 1994;
Morgan, 2006; Nowak, 1989; Svetlova, 2013), cognitive science (Rantala
& Vaden, 1994), psychology (Brzezinski, 1990; C. J. Lee, 2010), lin-
guistics (Blutner, 2011; Botha, 1982; Nowak, 2000a) and history
(Brzechczyn, 2009; Szwochert, 2016; Topolski, 2009). Philosophers
focus on the nature of idealisation and its functions. They are also
interested in the relationship between idealisation and other cognitive
procedures applied in science, as well as the role and importance of
idealisation in the context of the dispute regarding the epistemic status of
scientific theories (Ladyman, 2008). The relationships between ideal-
isation and abstraction (Nowak, 1990), idealisation and modelling
(Batterman, 2009), idealisation and explanation (Jebeile & Kennedy,
2015), idealisation and understanding (Potochnik, 2020), idealisation276and scientific realism/anti-realism (Cartwright, 1983) are just some ex-
amples of issues discussed in the literature.2.1. Core ideas and issues
Science is full of fiction. Point mass, ideal gas, perfectly round ball,
ideally smooth and spherical plane, infinite population, perfectly
informed economic agents – these are just a few examples of fiction,
highly useful in studying phenomena and processes within various fields
of science. These constructs are called idealisations and arise when the
complexity of the empirical systems studied or their conceptual repre-
sentations are subject to simplification (other terms used by philoso-
phers: reduction (Strevens, 2019, p. 1715), deformation (Nowak, 2000b,
p. 110) or distortion (Weisberg, 2015, p. 98)).
The counterfactual nature of the adopted assumptions is one of the
characteristics that distinguish idealisation from other cognitive strate-
gies used in science, such as abstraction:
An abstract description of a system leaves a lot out. But it is not
intended to say things that are literally false. An idealized description
of a system is a description that fictionalizes in the service of sim-
plification, in the way described above. The idealized description is
often presented verbally as a description of a real system, but not a
description that is literally true (Godfrey-Smith, 2009, p. 48).
Thanks to idealisation, the analysed phenomenon is represented as if
it did not have the characteristics that it actually possesses. The result is a
counterfactually deformed and ontically poorer representation.
Conversely, abstraction also involves ignoring certain characteristics but
without any particular consequences for the representation itself. It en-
ables obtaining the general concept from the knowledge of individual
objects. The already mentioned perfect roundness of a rolling ball, which
is one of the assumptions that Galileo Galilei made to explain the nature
of the movement, can be used as an example of idealisation. An example
of mental activity typical for abstraction can be the omission of any
property irrelevant to movement, such as the colour of the ball, in Gali-
leo's model.
The reconstruction of the research procedure, in which the ideal-
isation method was used, shows several key stages according to Nowak
(2000b, p. 111, 2012, p. 22). First, the researcher makes a division into
factors that exert and do not exert influence on the analysed magnitude F.
This creates the space of factors essential for F. Then, in the set of
essential factors, it distinguishes two subsets: principal factors and sec-
ondary factors. By prioritising the power of influence of individual
principal and secondary factors, the essential structure of F is created. In
the next step, the subject of research is deformed by adopting idealising
assumptions that ignore secondary effects. As research develops, there is
an accumulation of knowledge and the emergence of new cognitive
needs. The requirements for simple initial models are then increased. As a
result, the process of abandoning subsequent idealising assumptions may
begin. The initial models are then subject to concretisation (factualisa-
tion (Krajewski, 1977), de-idealisation (McMullin, 1985)) by gradually
taking into account the previously omitted secondary factors. The process
of concretisation is continued until an approximation to the facts suffi-
cient for the specific field of science is achieved.
This reconstruction is in itself a far-reaching simplification and,
therefore, requires several additions and reservations. First of all, the
counter factuality of the assumptions is a necessary condition for ideal-
isation, but no less important is the relevance of these assumptions. As
well as being in some ways false, an idealised representation should also
be useful. Perfect rationality of voters will not be an idealisation helpful
in explaining the socio-psychological conditions of electoral behaviour,
as it does not focus on the relevant causal relationships (Odenbaugh,
2005, p. 233). Secondly, the division into principal and secondary factors
is not always permanent. Over time, the magnitude of the effect of in-
dividual variables may vary, as shown (for example) by climate models.
M. Wajzer Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 90 (2021) 275–284The current anthropogenic impact on the extent and rate of climate
change is quite different from the impact in the period immediately
preceding the First Industrial Revolution. Thirdly, the role of idealisation
in the sequence of cognitive activities leading to the explanation of the
target phenomenon is not always limited to identifying causally irrele-
vant factors. It turns out that representationally inaccurate components
can be key in constructing an explanation, as shown by Jebeile and
Kennedy (2015) is using the example of the analysis of cosmological
hydrodynamical simulations. Fourthly, and finally, not all idealisations
can be concretised. The reasons for maintaining idealising assumptions
on a permanent basis may be the need to identify key causal patterns,
cognitive limits and absolute computational limits (Potochnik, 2017, pp.
58–60; Rice, 2019, p. 195).
Researchers are therefore guided by different, often intertwined
motivations when they introduce idealising assumptions into their
models. According to Batterman (2009, pp. 428–429), the two main
reasons for using the idealisation method are the need to improve the
computational efficiency of the model and to increase its explanatory
power. They result directly from the complexity of empirical systems.
Numerous non-linear causal relationships and feedback loops effectively
complicate the construction of highly detailed representations. Other
reasons for using the idealisationmethod include temporary and absolute
computational limits, as well as cognitive limits (Potochnik, 2017, pp.
47–49). The aspect nature of human cognition forces us to focus on only a
few causal factors, using the techniques, tools and computational powers
available at a given time. The widespread use of computer simulations in
the analysis of highly complex phenomena shows how important
research progress can be made when temporary computing limits are
systematically overcome.32.2. Idealisation as one of the deformational procedures
The human inclination to distort empirical reality is reflected in
various manifestations of cultural activity. Referring to the deformational
concept of culture (Nowak, 1990, pp. 196–198, 2012, pp. 33–35), two
weak-deformational procedures can be distinguished: positive and
negative potentialisations and two strong-deformational procedures:
reduction and transcendentalisation. When a representation has all the
properties of an original object, but at least one of them occurs at a degree
above the actual state, then we talk of positive potentialisation (of which
an extreme case is mythologisation). The opposite situation, i.e., the
presence in the representation of at least one property with a degree
lower than in the original object, means negative potentialisation (of
which an extreme case is ideation). A notion overestimating the actual
military potential of one's own country is an example of positive poten-
tialisation. Views that diminish the role of lobbying in perpetuating in-
equalities in democratic systems can, in turn, be considered examples of
negative potentialisation. Counterfactually omitting some of the char-
acteristics of the original is a procedure typical of reduction, while
counterfactually adding new characteristics to an object without basis in
reality is called transcendentalisation. Nazi racial hygiene was an ideol-
ogy that reduced the humanity of the representatives of the persecuted
ethnic groups. It resulted in reducing human individuals to a concen-
tration camp number tattooed on the forearm. The doctrines emphasising
the supernatural character of royal power can serve as examples of3 See Winsberg (2010) for much more detailed discussions on this and related
issues.
4 The key difference between weak- and strong-deformational procedures is
that while the former merely modify the values of a given factor (quantitative
transformation), the latter affect the space of properties of the object (qualitative
transformation). Both weak- and strong-deformational procedures are of a
counter-empirical nature, their essence is to distort reality and, as such, they
constitute the foundations of all intellectual activity of man (Nowak, 2012, p.
34).
277transcendentalisation. The image of the king as a superhuman being,
anointed by God, was the foundation for the legitimacy of power in
medieval Europe.4
Positive and negative potentialisation, reduction and tran-
scendentalisation are of elementary nature. Their combinations occur in
different areas of culture, creating deformational procedures with a
higher level of complexity. The use of reduction and positive potential-
isation results in fictionalisation – a cognitive activity characteristic for
literature and art. Every literary character, a figure depicted in a painting
or rendered in a sculpture, either because of technical limitations or as a
result of deliberate action by the artist, is devoid of certain features while
other features are exaggerated. The political caricature from the time of
the Watergate scandal, depicting Richard Nixon as Pinocchio, is one
possible example. The combination of transcendentalisation and positive
potentialisation results in absolutisation – a procedure commonly used in
religious and ideological narratives. It manifests itself in assigning to
different deities attributes that are not possessed by real beings. Usually,
these attributes appear in the maximum degree, making a given deity an
infinitely perfect being in every aspect. Appropriate examples can be
found in all the major monotheistic religions. Conversely, the combina-
tion of reduction and negative potentialisation is characteristic of ide-
alisation – a method that is the domain of science. In terms of the
deformational concept of culture, idealisation entails not taking into
account factors considered to be irrelevant in the essential structure of
the studied magnitude, as well as assuming a minimum value of other
factors, whose actual value can be taken into account in subsequent
stages of the study.5 The one-shot two-person Prisoner's Dilemma game is
both a product of reduction (it does not take into account the influence of,
e.g. the Earth's magnetic field or weather conditions on the interaction)
and an extreme case of negative potentialisation (it reduces to zero the
properties that can be sensibly attributed to the interaction, e.g., the
biological and psychological characteristics of the players).
3. Political science and genetic studies
For a long time, political studies have been conducted solely within
the framework of the paradigm considering the mechanisms of learning
and gaining experience to be the key determinants of political behav-
iours. Opinions emphasising the importance of biological factors have
appeared in political science literature since the 1970s. The ground for
the changes, which were to come a few decades later, was laid, for
example, by such scholars as Merelman (1971), Peterson and Somit
(1979), Schubert (1983) and Masters (1990). They were convinced that
political behaviours are the result of the interaction of two great systems:
culture and nature, and not the sole result of the socialisation and cul-
turalisation processes. They pointed to the significant role of genetic
mechanisms in the intergenerational transmission of political behaviours
and to the urgent need to integrate the traditional approaches of political
science with the perspective of political issues as biological phenomena.
Until the publication of the results of the study by Alford et al. (2005)
in the American Political Science Review, hypotheses regarding the rela-
tionship between genetic factors and political behaviours were occa-
sionally empirically tested (Bouchard et al., 2003; Eaves et al., 1999;
Martin et al., 1986; McCourt et al., 1999). Alford, Funk and Hibbing
assumed that political attitudes are heritable, i.e., they are conditioned
not only by environmental factors but also by genetic ones. The results
confirmed the assumptions of the researchers, showing that a part of the
variance of conservative and liberal attitudes can be explained by indi-
vidual genetic differences in the population. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing5 The influence of both reduced and negative potentialisation factors are
known to researchers. It should not be forgotten, however, that they also ignore
the influence of factors of which they are not aware (the ceteris paribus con-
dition) and which can only be identified on the basis of an examination of
differences between predictions and observations (Grobler, 2006, pp. 171–174).
6 More specifically, the transfer of theory from one field to another applies, in
Remisiewicz's view, only to those theoretical structures that could be used to
explain the behaviours of entities of a different class than before the transfer. A
situation in which the theoretical structures of one field are used to explain the
behaviours of entities from another field occurs, for example, in memetics and in
evolutionary psychology. These fields develop explanations for a variety of so-
cial phenomena based on concepts originally applicable only to the studies of
biological organisms.
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teristics between pairs of reared-together monozygotic (identical, MZ)
and same-sex dizygotic (fraternal, DZ) twins. Furthermore, the twin
method has been used to study the genetic foundations of such traits and
phenomena as, for example, political participation (Fowler et al., 2008),
the transmission of political attitudes in different stages of one's lifetime
(Hatemi et al., 2009), partisan attachment (Settle et al., 2009), foreign
policy preferences (Cranmer&Dawes, 2012), ideological beliefs (Kalmoe
& Johnson, 2021) or associations of political attitudes with religiosity
(Friesen & Ksiazkiewicz, 2015), need to evaluate (Ksiazkiewicz &
Krueger, 2017) and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Kleppestø et al.,
2019). Then, extended research schemes, applying the data not only
related to twins, but also parents, spouses, children, relatives, and
non-twin full siblings of the twins, were used to study the genetic foun-
dations of, e.g., liberal and conservative attitudes (Bell et al., 2018;
Hatemi et al., 2010), the transmission of attitudes toward inequality and
system change (Kandler et al., 2012) and political orientations over the
course of an individual's life (Hufer et al., 2020).
The most common objection to the twin method is the risk of over-
estimating the magnitude of genetic influence due to a violation of the
equal environment assumption (EEA). It appears that the greater simi-
larity in the behaviours of the reared together MZ twins is not necessarily
due to genetic influences but may be dictated by identical parenting
practices or a tendency to maintain closer relationships compared to DZ
twins. The risk of artificial inflation of heritability may also result from
epigenetic influences and the correlation between the genotype and the
environment. Concerns are also raised in the literature regarding the
temporal and spatial relativisation of the conceptualisation of measured
behaviours (Ksiazkiewicz & Friesen, 2017).
In addition to classical heritability studies, research using more so-
phisticated molecular techniques is also being conducted. CGAS, which
involve discovering the relationship between the variation in the nucle-
otide sequence at a certain specified locus in the genome and the varia-
tion in a specific phenotypic trait in the population, were used, for
example, to study the relationships between the genes encoding the en-
zymes responsible for regulating the metabolism of serotonin and elec-
toral participation (Deppe et al., 2013; Fowler & Dawes, 2008) and
political violence (McDermott et al., 2013), as well as the relationships
between the genes encoding the enzymes participating in the regulation
of the activity of dopamine with political ideology (Settle et al., 2010),
and partisanship and voting (Dawes& Fowler, 2009). Conversely, GWAS,
which enable the analysis of hundreds of thousands of single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) within the entire genome, were used in studies of
conservative and liberal attitudes (Hatemi et al., 2011), political and
economic preferences (Benjamin et al., 2012), as well as political ideol-
ogies (Hatemi et al., 2014).
Molecular techniques saw first applications in the research of political
behaviours relatively recently, so molecular studies' results should be
considered in terms of new hypotheses rather than mature and validated
knowledge. Molecular techniques, like all research techniques, also have
their limitations. Because of the enormous complexity of political be-
haviours and the small effect sizes of individual genetic variants,
considerable difficulties may be experienced in detecting specific asso-
ciations. However, this situation is not particularly surprising, given that
political behaviours are likely influenced by thousands of genes inter-
acting with one another and the environment. Therefore, the identified
genetic markers serve only as clues to show which genomic, epigenetic
and neural pathways may be significant in the emergence and formation
of the analysed behaviours: ‘The finding that a single genetic marker has
some influence on a trait, may implicate a particular biological pathway
consisting of hundreds or thousands of genetic and neurobiological
mechanisms that result in hormonal release and cognitive and emotive
changes, which in turn influence behaviour’ (Hatemi et al., 2012, pp.
313–314).
In the analysis of the manner of linking genetics with political science,
the typology of Remisiewicz (2017), originally created to discuss the278types of influence exerted by biology on sociology, seems highly useful.
Adapting it to the needs of the reflection presented herein, three possible
types of links between biology and political science can be distinguished:
— Proper biologism – data and methods, as well as biological the-
ories, are incorporated into political science;
— Biologism without biology – only biological theories are trans-
posed from biology to political science;
— Biology without biologism – biological data and methods are
introduced into political science without incorporating the theo-
retical structures of biology.6
The studies of the genetic foundations of political behaviours seem to
point to the third method of linking political science with genetics. The
transfer of genetic data and methods to political science is not accom-
panied by the transfer of genetic theories, which could be used in the
analysis of political processes and phenomena. Genetic studies add new
aspects to the structure of the political science explanatory chain, without
replacing any of its links. They are, thus, far from the ‘imperialist’ in-
clinations of Wilsonian sociobiology, which postulated the lossless
reduction of sociology to biology.
4. Excessive reductionism objection
A common philosophical objection against the studies of the genetic
foundations of political behaviours is that of excessive reductionism. The
explication of the concept of reductionism in texts critical of genopolitics
is characterised by high heterogeneity and, therefore, requires detailed
analysis. The allegation of excessive reductionism usually appears in the
context of three arguments. The first concerns the lack of adequacy be-
tween the phenomenon explained and the adopted level of analysis. The
second raises the issue of the incompleteness of genetic explanations of
political behaviour. The third indicates the low explanatory utility of
genopolitical studies.
4.1. Inadequacy of the level of analysis
Drawing conclusions regarding political phenomena on the basis of
genetic analyses can, according to critics, be considered as reaching too
far. The reason for this is the lack of consistency between the explained
phenomenon and the adopted level of analysis. Explaining political be-
haviours by genetic factors, if not inherently impossible, is, at best,
pointless – given the state of knowledge and methodological potential.
The currently insurmountable obstacle is the epistemic gap between
genes and behaviours. According to this interpretation, genopolitical
research provides only apparent knowledge that may mislead those who
are not sufficiently familiar with the issue. The problem of the proper
selection of the level of analysis to the explained phenomenon was raised
by Charney (2008, p. 341):
[…] different kinds of explanation are appropriate to different kinds
of phenomena, and it is only a misunderstanding of the phenomenon
in question that allows one to seek an inappropriate explanation for it.
The same is true in science. Quantum mechanics has very little to tell
us about the functioning of the human heart, and if a physicist
claimed that the resolution of remaining difficulties with string the-
ory promised greater understanding of the etiology of heart disease,
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was. (Note that this phenomenon, the “irreducibility” of our scientific
knowledge about the human heart to our scientific knowledge about
quantum mechanics, does not mean that the heart is a mystical phe-
nomenon, or lead to the positing of a “heart-matter dualism”).
Genetic explanations of political behaviours, as well as the quantum-
mechanical aetiology of heart disease, according to Engelmann (2010, p.
61), are examples of ‘misguided materialism’ (Francis, 2004, pp. 94–95).
Although biological entities are made up of chemical components, the
gradation of matter itself does not imply a cause and effect relationship
between the chemical and the biological. This observation also applies to
higher levels of organisation. Societies consist of social groups, which in
turn are formed by biological entities. This relationship, however, does
not ultimately determine the role of genetic or neurobiological factors in
the process of the occurrence of social facts.
4.2. Incompleteness of the explanation
Critics of genetic studies emphasise that the concentration of research
efforts on individual genes or functionally isolated sets of genes is
cognitively fruitless. With such complex phenotypic traits as political
behaviours, a number of different factors can be expected to exert their
influence, and among them genetic factors are likely to play a lesser role:
The cogency of the search for single main-effect genes in complex
human behavior must be reconsidered. Proteins encoded by at least
266 genes are involved in variation in aggression in fruit flies, yet at
the same time, the heritability of aggression is less than ~0.1 because
of the high level of environmental variance (even though the re-
searchers assumed the environments were identical). If such is the
level of genetic complexity and the importance of environmental
interaction implicated in behavioral variation in fruit flies, why
should we assume that, when it comes to human behavior, things are
any simpler? We would expect all of the factors influencing political
behavior to be several orders of magnitude more complex, at least on
the order of the difference between the brain of the fruit fly, with
~100,000 neurons, and the human brain, with ~100 billion (Charney
& English, 2012, p. 30).
The political phenotype is conditioned bymultiple interacting factors;
therefore, genetic explanations are characterised, according to Charney
and English, by significant incompleteness. In the midst of different in-
teractions, exposing the meaning of genetic influences seems to be a
strategy that is cognitively wrong. This view consequently leads to
questioning the validity of genopolitical studies.
4.3. Low explanatory utility
The two previous arguments explicitly or implicitly undermine the
validity of the search for relationships between genetic factors and po-
litical behaviours, while the argument referring to the low explanatory
utility of genopolitical research demonstrates what knowledge is not
provided by this research:
[…] it is impossible to explain to a blind person what colours are by
telling her about the neurophysiology of colour-perception; it is
equally impossible to understand why someone has certain political
views by looking at her genetic asset. The answer to the question why
someone has a certain political opinion is part of an entirely different
‘language-game’ than the answer to the question of how two people
with different political views differ genetically (Weiss, 2016, p. 324).
Weiss notes that genopolitical studies do not explain the key problem
for a political scientist: why individuals display one type of political ac-
tivity, and not another. Charney (2008, p. 342) went one step further,
illustrating his position with an example of a study of pro and contra279attitudes towards the US Constitution. In his opinion, even if the expla-
nation of the ‘aetiology’ of attitudes towards the constitution was correct,
genopolitical theory would not answer many other extremely highly
relevant questions, such as when by whom and why the constitution was
written or what ideological values it promotes.
5. Genetic explanations of political behaviours
Anti-reductionist criticism of the genetic explanations of political
behaviours is a conglomerate of views with a common denominator in
the form of the conviction as to the fruitlessness of the efforts to discover
the ultimate causes of political behaviours. After all, numerous studies
show that the importance of physico-chemical mechanisms decreases
with the increasing complexity of biological hierarchical systems.
Therefore, in the opinion of critics, genopolitical research is founded on
equally erroneous ontological and epistemological premises as the crude
mechanicism of the scientific revolution or the reductionist physicalism
of the nineteenth century. The reductionism of genetic explanations di-
minishes the role of environmental influences, which, in addition to the
purely cognitive consequences, may have undesirable social conse-
quences. The analysis of genopolitical research, however, does not
confirm such conclusions. Researchers of genopolitics are aware of the
high level of complexity of the analysed phenomena and the limitations
resulting from this fact.
5.1. Causal complexity
Even studies of very simple organisms show how complicated a
phenomenon life is. The nematode Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans)was
the first multicellular organism whose genome we were able to sequence.
It has attracted the attention of biologists since the second half of the
nineteenth century and has been a model organism since the second half
of the twentieth century, which means that it is used to study biological
processes occurring not only in representatives of related species, but also
in organisms on a much higher level of complexity, including humans.
The adult nematode is 1–2mm long, inhabits soils in different parts of the
world and feeds on bacteria. It has over 20,000 protein-coding genes. The
adult hermaphrodite body (dominant sex) consists of 959 somatic cells,
of which 302 are neurons, while adult males have 1031 somatic cells,
including 381 neurons (Felix & Braendle, 2010). Researchers have
extensively studied not only the genome of C. elegans, but also its con-
nectome and have gained knowledge about the relationships between
genes, the nervous system and the developmental environment. The
studies of the biological and environmental conditions of behavioural
patterns in nematodes show unusual complexity and multiple levels of
interactions. Schaffner (1999, pp. 73–77) summarised their results by
formulating eight general principles:
1) Any neuron is the result of the activity of multiple different genes;
2) A single behavioural pattern is created by the activity of multiple
neurons (neural circuits);
3) Any gene, affecting multiple different neurons, can indirectly affect
many different patterns of behaviour (pleiotropic genes);
4) One neuron may be involved in the formation of multiple patterns of
behaviour (multifunctional neurons);
5) Different behavioural traits in genetically identical individuals, bred
under the same environmental conditions, may result from random
anatomical differences in the structure of nervous systems (develop-
mental noise);
6) Different developmental environments result in different patterns of
behaviour, even in genetically identical individuals (phenotypic
plasticity);
7) Gene expression depends on epigenetic factors;
8) Genes interact with each other, affecting the development of neurons
and the formation of phenotypes in multiple ways (epistasis).
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system, and the developmental environment in organisms as simple as
C. elegans can serve as a starting point for the research into organisms
with higher levels of complexity. Extrapolations of the regularities
identified in simple organisms to human behaviour, however, should be
carried out with due caution and any conclusions drawn on this basis are
subject to many reservations. Comparisons between species are, how-
ever, not unwarranted, and, in the discussed case, their value is mainly
manifested in highlighting the complexity of the problem.
Although living organisms display clear characteristics of hierarchical
systems, phenomena from lower levels do not necessarily determine
what happens at higher levels. If we even have a full physico-chemical
description of molecular processes at our disposal, it is unlikely that we
will ever be able to predict the phenotypic effect at a high level of
complexity. Complex systems, therefore, do not display a simple, linear
relationship between cause and effect. This is due to several reasons.
Apart from unusual complexity, manifested by, for example, many
mutually related determinants, lack of symmetry and the influence of
random events, emergent properties appear on each level of the system,
i.e., properties whose existence cannot be predicted on the basis of
knowledge regarding the individual components of the system. An
additional complication is generated by a multiple realisation of a spe-
cific behavioural pattern. It should not be expected that higher-level
properties will be realised by strictly defined sets of lower-level proper-
ties. The realising elements themselves, however, when participating in
the creation of a specific behavioural pattern, may occupy different levels
in the system structure in different entities.7
5.2. Idealised explanations
The high degree of complexity of the system and its stochastic nature
implies a need for high levels of caution in drawing conclusions from the
relationships identified between genes and behaviours in C. elegans. The
interpretation of the results of studies of organisms at a level of complexity
higher by several orders of magnitude becomes muchmore difficult. While
classical heritability studies show that usually between 30 and 40% of the
variation in the analysed political behaviour can be explained by genetic
variation, studies using molecular techniques do not, as of yet, allow for
drawing any unanimous conclusions. The reason being methodological
limitations. This problemwas noted by Hatemi et al. (2014, p. 292), whose
study relying on GWAS did not yield positive results:
The failure to identify significant SNPs should not be surprising. Our
findings are consistent with genome-wide explorations on almost any
complex trait; a single gene or small group of genes does not directly
influence ideological preferences. Rather, thousands of genetic vari-
ants of very small effects and constellations of genes interact with
each other and the environment to influence behavior, indirectly. For
social and behavioral traits, such as political attitudes and ideologies,
in which measures and definitions change as a function of time,
location and climate, sample size and measurement limitations pre-
sent a challenge. Even if we could ensure the perfect measure, the
plethora of relevant individual genes and their complex interactions
with other genes, as well as the environment counsel against
expecting that any individual genetic markers could explain a sizable
amount of the genetic variance in political temperament and without
a very large sample, identifying genes of small effects is unlikely. Our
findings are consistent with this polygenic expectation, and spur us to
gather larger samples.
Two previous GWAS-based studies (Benjamin et al., 2012; Hatemi
et al., 2011) also failed to identify specific polymorphisms; however,
estimates of heritability obtained in one of these studies partially7 Potochnik and McGill (2012) provide an excellent account of the issue of the
hierarchical structure of life.
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et al., 2012). Small sample sizes are a major problem with GWAS con-
ducted to date. They did not exceed several thousand individuals. In
comparison, GWAS conducted to identify genetic variants associated
with income (Hill et al., 2019), social stratification (Abdellaoui et al.,
2019) and educational attainment (J. J. Lee et al., 2018) were based on
the sample sizes of, respectively: 286,301, 456,426 and 1,131,881
individuals.
The magnitude of the difficulty of discovering associations between
single genes and political behaviours was also demonstrated by replica-
tions of CGAS-based studies. For example, the results obtained by Fowler
and Dawes (2008) were only partially confirmed. The relationship be-
tween the polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTT) and
electoral turnout was confirmed, while the assumed dependence of the
monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) was probably a false positive (Deppe
et al., 2013; Fowler & Dawes, 2013). This example and the failure to
replicate research from other fields (Duncan et al., 2019) show that CGAS
results should be approached with caution, at least until they are
confirmed in studies with much larger sample sizes.
Either way, further molecular studies are necessary to more accu-
rately assess the cognitive value of the studies conducted to date. As I
have pointed out several times, due to the small effect sizes of SNPs,
replications and new studies should be conducted using very large
sample sizes; also, the applied research techniques require continuous
development. Charney's comment concerning the lack of fitness of the
analysis level to the phenomenon explained would only be justified if
researchers of genopolitics interpreted political behaviours in terms of
simple Mendelian traits. However, this is not the case, as the analysis of
the research conducted so far clearly demonstrates.
Because of the cumulative effect of thousands of genes, it will prob-
ably never be possible to identify specific alleles that can explain a sub-
stantial part of the variation in complex behavioural traits in a
population. Each studied gene's influence is only a small part of a much
larger and extremely complex system. Researchers of genopolitics,
however, are aware of the limitations. They usually emphasise that their
goal is to focus on selected dependencies but at the same time point out
the important role of factors, which they do not take into account in their
analyses. Fowler and Dawes (2008, p. 590), for example, clearly state
that the existence of a single gene responsible for electoral participation
is unlikely; at the same time, they note the relevancy of entire sets of
genes and environments. Similarly, Hannagan and Hatemi (2008, p. 333)
note: ‘It is unlikely that “the” gene for conservatism, financial success, a
great golf stroke, or any other complex trait will be identified. It is more
likely that complex networks of genes, for which causal variation might
be specified, are the appropriate targets for future research. Genes likely
establish general inclinations or predispositions that shape our inter-
pretation and reaction to experiences. Those experiences increase the
likelihood of developing a specific trait or attitude.’ McDermott et al.
(2013, p. 1058) stipulate, however, that their analysis involves only one
gene product that is likely not irrelevant to neuronal transmission in
serotonergic and dopaminergic pathways as well as other related sys-
tems. These systems consist of thousands of gene products, and therefore
individual markers are unlikely, as it seems, to have a major impact on
any complex social behaviour.
Two further reservations with regard to genopolitical studies:
incompleteness and low explanatory utility, therefore, seem just as
questionable, particularly when we consider the role played by the ide-
alisation method in the study of complex systems. In explaining the
variance of a particular behaviour, we could take into consideration a
number of factors whose impact is found in different scientific disci-
plines, frequently by using entirely different methodologies. Behavioural
geneticists, neurobiologists, political scientists or sociologists focus their
attention on factors that are considered key from the point of view of
their theoretical perspectives while ignoring the influence of factors
deemed less important. None of the approaches is able to obtain a
comprehensive picture of the analysed phenomenon on its own;
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partial. The orientation of individual approaches towards different causal
patterns may be one of the obstacles to building a unified approach in the
future.
Researchers of genopolitics follow the same cognitive procedure as
sociologists or political scientists focusing exclusively on environmental
influences. According to Nowak's model, the process leading from the
establishment of pre-theoretical goals to the formulation of a genetic
explanation of a studied political behaviour takes place in several stages,
in which the researcher:
1) Simplifies reality on the basis of the adopted ontological perspective,
i.e., makes a demarcation between factors that affect and those that
do not affect the analysed behaviour. The latter are then reduced,
which means that they are not taken into account in the next research
stages. Among those can be included, for example, the physical pa-
rameters of the Earth or the type of diet adhered to by the re-
spondents. As a result, the space of essential factors for the analysed
behaviour is created, consisting of physiological, neurobiological,
psychological, cultural, social etc. factors, in addition to the genetic
ones;
2) On the basis of the adopted theoretical perspective, determines which
of the factors in the space of essential factors are principal and which
are secondary to the analysed behaviour;
3) Etablishes the hierarchy of the power of influence of particular
principal and secondary factors, thanks to which an essential struc-
ture of the examined behaviour is created;
4) Introduces idealising assumptions under which the effect of second-
ary factors is subject to ideation (extreme case of negative potenti-
alisation). In other words, recognises that physiological,
neurobiological, psychological, social, or cultural factors assume the
value of zero and, therefore, do not affect the analysed magnitude;
5) Finally, can modify the initial claim by way of concretisation. By
abandoning subsequent idealising assumptions, the researcher will
demonstrate how the examined behaviour depends on the influence
of secondary factors.
As I mentioned in Section 2.1, the model presented above is in itself a
highly idealised construct; therefore, when taking into account specific
genetic studies, one should take into account the possibility of smaller or
larger deviations. These will mainly concern the last step, which is rare.
However, some molecular studies also uncover the influence of envi-
ronmental factors, specifically the gene-environment interaction
(G  E).8 It appears, for example, that the association between the 5-HTT
gene and voter turnout studied by Fowler and Dawes (2008) was most
likely moderated by exposure to religious activity. In contrast, McDer-
mott et al. (2013) found that individuals with a low-activityMAOA allele
who were exposed to violent behaviour in their youth were more likely to
engage in physical violence later in life.
One area where concretisations will emerge along methodological
development may be the interface between genopolitics and neuro-
politics. Neurobiological data help to single out genes that may be
important in the emergence and formation of a particular behaviour,
while genetic data point to important neurobiological components. Thus,
genes whose influence on bodily processes is fairly well known are
subject to being singled out. These include the genes that determine brain
development, hormone production, synthesis and uptake of neurotrans-
mitters, as well as transcription factors. The development of connections
between genopolitics and neuropolitics will perhaps provide a much
broader picture of the biological determinants of political behaviours in
the future. Until then, the connections between genopolitical and neu-
ropolitical research can be considered, for example, in terms of mecha-
nistic inter-field integration, which results in the formulation of mosaic-8 G  E stands for genetic susceptibility to the environment.
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evidence from different research fields (Craver, 2005, 2007).
However, as a rule, influences ignored in studies of the genetic
foundations of political behaviour are analysed, as I mentioned earlier, in
separate research approaches introducing their own idealising assump-
tions.9 The reason for this may be the methodological limitations of the
early stage of research development. Therefore, one would expect that
with the emergence of new cognitive needs and the development of more
effective research techniques, these limitations would be overcome.
However, this scenario would require the emergence of unified ap-
proaches, which will be very difficult to achieve due to the focus of re-
searchers on specific causal influences. However, a temporary or
permanent lack of the possibility of concretisation of the claimsmade in a
given research field does not necessarily entail a low explanatory power
of these claims and that the field itself is regressive, which results, in a
way, from concepts that tie the explanatory power of a representation
only to representatively correct components (Bokulich, 2011; McMullin,
1985; Strevens, 2019). As I pointed out in Section 2.1, maintaining ide-
alising assumptions may result from many reasons, chief among them
being the realisability of the representation.
6. Reductionism of genopolitics
If my findings are accurate, then the objection of excessive reduc-
tionism against the research of genetic foundations of political behav-
iours does not apply, and its origins probably lie in the insufficient
appreciation of the idealisation method. What remains is to answer the
question: what are the characteristics of the reductionism of
genopolitics?
Political behaviours, like other biosocial phenomena, are not deter-
mined solely by a single causal pattern. Researchers are faced with many
interrelated causal influences, and it is only up to their decision which
factors they will adopt as the focus of their research and which they will
permanently and/or temporarily ignore. This situation is a result of the
very nature of the analysed system and human cognitive limitations. As a
result, researchers of genopolitics, in formulating highly idealised ex-
planations, follow the guidelines of methodological reductionism, a
methodological directive that implies the division of the studied system
into small components. Many scientific theories assume this type of
reductionism, focusing on selected small elements of target systems.
However, this does not mean that an analysis of all isolated elements can
provide a basis for explaining the system as a whole:
There is an integration of the parts at each level, from the cell to
tissues, organs, organ systems, and whole organisms. This integration
is found at the biochemical level, at the developmental level, and in
whole organisms at the behavioral level. All holists agree that no
system can be exhaustively explained by the properties of its isolated
components. The basis of organicism is the fact that living beings
have organization. They are not just piles of characters or molecules,
because their function depends entirely on their organization, their
mutual interrelations, interactions, and interdependencies (Mayr,
2001, pp. 18–19).
However, the nature of political behaviours calls into question such
types of reductionism as ontological, causal, and epistemological. Onto-
logical reductionism assumes that higher order beings are nothing more
than the sum of their parts. Causal reductionism holds that a system's
components' behaviour determines the system's behaviour as a whole. In
contrast, epistemological reductionism claims that laws and theories
about higher order phenomena can be derived from the laws and theories
describing lower order phenomena and, ultimately, laws and physics
theories without a loss (Murphy, 2009). According to the current state of9 Similar conclusions were reached by Potochnik (2017, pp. 70–80), after
analysing the studies on the genetic conditions of violence.
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curate when studying complex biosocial phenomena. Nor are they the
assumptions adopted by scholars formulating genetic explanations of
political behaviours.
7. Summary
Studies of the genetic foundations of political behaviours have caused
much controversy in social sciences. One of the objections made against
them is that of excessive reductionism. This is supposed to manifest itself
in the inadequate selection of the level of analysis for the explained
phenomenon, the incompleteness of explanations and low explanatory
utility. Political behaviours are determined by many intertwined factors.
In the opinion of the critics, this is not appreciated by the researchers of
genopolitics, who focus exclusively on genetic influences, leaving much
more relevant dependencies outside their scope of interests. In reality,
however, researchers of genopolitics are well aware of the complexity of
the process of translating genetic effects into behaviours and their focus
only on selected causal influences is justified by methodological reduc-
tionism – a methodological directive that assumes the division of the
studied system into small components. The analysis of the dispute over
genopolitics clearly demonstrates the existence of cognitive and
communication barriers between the disputing parties, as pointed out by
Hatemi and McDermott (2012, p. 527): ‘Most researchers consider po-
litical traits to be influenced by thousands of genetic markers both indi-
rectly and through interactions with numerous environmental stimuli
and other genes in complex genomic, epigenetic, and neural pathways.
By contrast, many criticisms are developed as if responding to the view
that political traits are simple Mendelian traits, governed by a single gene
or a small set of genes.'
Political phenotype studies, depending on the research objectives and
assumptions, take into account multiple different factors, among which
genetic, neurobiological or physiological factors seem to be just as war-
ranted as social or cultural factors. This is indicated by studies carried out
using the best methodologies currently available to us. Political behav-
iours are, in all probability, the result of the interaction between culture
and nature, and not the result of unilateral cultural influences. Research
concerning the genetic basis of political behaviours is not a competitive
position for traditional behaviouralism but one of its supplements and
evolutions.
In order to obtain a more complete picture of the process of genera-
tion and formation of political behaviours, both the cumulative effect of
thousands of individual genes and the influence of epigenetic, neurobi-
ological and physiological factors, as well as the environment and
random events, should be taken into account. The state of our knowledge
and methodological possibilities, however, are not conducive to building
a unified approach. This situation may be temporary or permanent. Ac-
cording to the first interpretation, the emergence of new cognitive needs
and methodological development will enable the researchers of geno-
politics to abandon gradually their idealising assumptions. According to
the second interpretation, methodological limitations resulting from the
fact that researchers working within different approaches focus on
different causal patterns will prove insurmountable.
Explanations of political behaviours, whether they emphasise the
relevance of environmental or biological determinants, are highly ide-
alised in nature. The process – from the formulation of pre-theoretical
objectives to the explanation of the analysed dependence – is carried
out in several stages. First, a division is made into factors that affect and
do not affect the analysed behaviour. The latter are then reduced, which
means that they are not taken into account in the next research stages,
while the former are divided into principal and secondary factors. Then,
the secondary factors are subject to an extreme case of negative poten-
tialisation – ideation. In other words, their value is counterfactually
reduced to zero. If this does not conflict with research objectives and is
feasible, then as the research evolves and new cognitive needs arise,
some idealising assumptions may be concretised. Taking into account the282impact of secondary factors brings the researcher closer to showing the
actual dependence of the analysed behaviour on the influences consid-
ered to be essential. In the light of the findings described above, the
reductionism of research into the genetic foundations of political be-
haviours can be considered as a standard cognitive procedure applied in
science.
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